{"id":4933,"date":"2026-03-17T11:59:20","date_gmt":"2026-03-17T11:59:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.borderforensics.org\/?post_type=investigation&p=4933"},"modified":"2026-04-26T11:36:10","modified_gmt":"2026-04-26T11:36:10","slug":"channel","status":"publish","type":"investigation","link":"https:\/\/www.borderforensics.org\/it\/investigations\/channel\/","title":{"rendered":"How \u2018stopping the boats\u2019 kills"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\"\"<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

A digital counter-forensic investigation of the human cost of the UK\u2019s externalised border in the Channel<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Download the full report here<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Abstract<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

How \u2018stopping the boats\u2019 kills<\/em> presents findings from a year-long collaborative investigation by researchers at the ESRC Centre for Sociodigital Futures at the University of Bristol, and Border Forensics, an independent research agency based in Geneva, Switzerland. The report demonstrates how the UK government\u2019s \u2018Stop the Boats\u2019 policies, and over \u00a3625 million given to the French to prevent departures, have directly contributed to a sharp rise in deaths of people attempting to cross the Channel in so-called small boats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Drawing on data from migrant solidarity activists in northern France, French coastguard records, and UK Home Office transparency data, this investigation identifies a dramatic surge in fatal incidents beginning Summer 2023. Crucially, this rise in deaths came as the numbers of dinghies and people arriving to the UK fell<\/strong>, and despite an increase in aerial surveillance and maritime search-and-rescue capacity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Geospatial analysis showed these increased deaths occurred closer to French shores, and interviews with activists and migrants revealed them to be the result of new deadly mechanisms: extreme overcrowding<\/strong>, resulting in people being crushed inside of dinghies, and chaotic launches<\/strong>, often in the midst of violent police interventions to prevent departures. The entangled effects of three border policing practices behind these mechanisms are examined in detail in the report:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

  1. \u2018Upstream\u2019 anti-smuggling measures and supply-chain disruption<\/strong>: International cooperation has reduced the availability of dinghies and other materials needed for small boat journeys, leading facilitators to source larger and lower quality inflatables which are increasingly overcrowded. Anti-smuggling measures have also reduced the opportunities for under-resourced groups to organise their own journeys\u2014strengthening the hold of professionalised smugglers on the market\u2014and fuelled competition for places onboard.<\/li>
  2. Expanded aerial surveillance<\/strong>: Although framed primarily in terms of supporting search and rescue operations, analysis of flight tracks and state documentation showed most aerial surveillance of the Channel is focused on coordinating police patrols on the ground, and gathering data and intelligence for prosecutions. By enabling faster detection and police intervention, surveillance has contributed to overcrowding and the advent of new dangerous tactics for small boat departures.<\/li>
  3. Increased police activity on the French coast<\/strong>: The ever larger numbers of police on the French coast, funded by the UK, has altered the geography of small boat departures, and driven the adoption of the \u2018taxi boats\u2019 which present greater risks for travellers who must board dinghies already afloat. Police\u2019s violent tactics, especially the use of riot control weapons such as tear-gas, stun grenades, and rubber bullets, have also directly endangered travellers and led to panics, crushes, and people drowning in shallow waters.<\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    The report demonstrates how these border policing practices, which authorities claim \u2018save lives\u2019 by preventing crossing attempts, have amplified the risks facing people compelled to make illegalised journeys to reach the UK. It also shows that British and French officials knew, or ought to have known, the deadly consequences of their policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Decades of increased security and policing at the UK\u2019s externalised border have not ended illegalised journeys and, despite being a political priority since 2019, small boat journeys have not stopped. As this report shows, greater enforcement has not only failed to achieve its stated objective, but led to more deaths in the Channel. Whether this reality can be recognised by policy-makers and prompt a fundamental reassessment of UK border externalisation remains an open question. For now, as the next phase of bilateral cooperation for 2026-29 is set to begin, the UK government appears determined to continue using large payments to leverage the French to adopt ever riskier tactics to police its border, regardless of the human costs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Introduction<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    In 1999 the Red Cross opened a shelter in Sangatte, France for people denied safe transport to the United Kingdom (UK) by \u2018juxtaposed\u20191<\/a><\/sup>For more information on the UK\u2019s juxtaposed controls across the Channel see Home Office, \u2018The UK\u2019s Juxtaposed Border Controls\u2019, Home Office in the Media, 6 April 2023, https:\/\/homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk\/2023\/04\/06\/the-uks-juxtaposed-border-controls\/<\/a>.<\/span> border controls requiring travellers clear immigration before crossing the Channel. From that year until 2026 journalists recorded at least 525 migrant deaths at Britain\u2019s border with Europe.2<\/a><\/sup>Ma\u00ebl Galisson, \u2018Voir Calais et mourir, 367 fois\u2019, Les Jours, 15 May 2023, https:\/\/lesjours.fr\/obsessions\/calais-migrants-morts\/ep1-memorial\/.<\/span> For more than 20 years those who lost their lives were mostly attempting to travel hidden in trucks, trains, and shipping containers. More than half of all deaths (309) have occurred since 2019, when crossings in so-called small boats3<\/a><\/sup>This report uses the term small boat for coherence with the most widely used nomenclature in the media, and to avoid the negatively racialised connotations of alternatives such as \u2018migrant crossings\u2019. However, it must be stated that the term first came to be used to refer to this type of journey at a time when mostly small purpose-built, seaworthy craft were being used for Channel crossings in 2018. The large rubber inflatable dinghies used today cannot faithfully be described as boats, and regularly hold between 50 and 100 passengers. The reasons for the shift to larger, unseaworthy vessels\u2014which are still referred to as small boats by the government and in the media\u2014is discussed at length in Section 3.<\/span> became commonplace. Of those, as many as 197 died or went missing in the Channel, with 129\u2014nearly a quarter of all deaths in the history of the UK\u2019s externalised border\u2014in the three years from 2023 to the end of 2025. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    This recent surge in the numbers of people dying does not clearly correlate with increased numbers making the journey. Instead, the Channel has become deadlier following an explosion of investment from the British government, and increased cooperation with European states, to \u2018Stop the Boats\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n

    \n
    \n

    \n This recent surge in the numbers of people dying does not clearly correlate with increased numbers making the journey. Instead, the Channel has become deadlier following an explosion of investment from the British government, and increased cooperation with European states, to \u2018Stop the Boats\u2019. <\/p>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n\n\n\n\n

    Repeating the pattern well-known from other border-zones of the rich world such as the Sonoran Desert,4<\/a><\/sup>Denise N. Obinna, \u2018Death in the Borderlands: Necropolitics and Migration-Related Mortality at the US-Mexico Border\u2019, Politics & Policy<\/em> 53, no. 3 (2025): e70046, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1111\/polp.70046.<\/span> Mediterranean Sea,5<\/a><\/sup>Laura Lo Presti, \u2018Terraqueous Necropolitics: Unfolding the Low-Operational, Forensic, and Evocative Mapping of Mediterranean Sea Crossings in the Age of Lethal Borders\u2019, ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies<\/em> 18, no. 6 (2019): 1347\u201367, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.14288\/acme.v18i6.1829.<\/span> and Atlantic Ocean,6<\/a><\/sup>\u00d2scar Prieto-Flores, \u2018Necropolitics at the Southern European Border: Deaths and Missing Migrants on the Western Mediterranean and Atlantic Coasts\u2019, Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics<\/em>, 24 March 2025, 1\u201317, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/rep.2025.19.<\/span> increased policing and strengthened security at the UK\u2019s externalised border has imperilled travellers. From counter-forensic investigations in the Mediterranean it is by now well-known that European state actors can kill illegalised7<\/a><\/sup>H. Bauder, \u2018Why We Should Use the Term \u201cIllegalized\u201d Refugee or Immigrant: A Commentary\u2019, International Journal of Refugee Law<\/em> 26, no. 3 (2014): 327\u201332, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1093\/ijrl\/eeu032.<\/span> migrants by abandoning them to die at sea8<\/a><\/sup>Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani, \u2018The Left-to-Die Boat\u2019, Forensic Architecture, 11 April 2012, https:\/\/forensic-architecture.org\/investigation\/the-left-to-die-boat.<\/span> or using force to push them back.9<\/a><\/sup>Stefanos Levidis and Christina Varvia, \u2018The Pylos Shipwreck\u2019, Forensic Architecture, 7 July 2023, https:\/\/forensic-architecture.org\/investigation\/the-pylos-shipwreck.<\/span> There have also been cases where state-related (in)action played a role in migrants\u2019 deaths in the Channel.10<\/a><\/sup>Sir Ross Cranston, The Cranston Inquiry Report: Report of the Public Inquiry into the Events of 23 to 24 November 2021, When over 30 People Died Attempting to Cross the English Channel in a Small Boat<\/em>, HC 1581 (2026), https:\/\/cranston.independent-inquiry.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/DFT_Cranston-inquiry-report_WEB.pdf.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    However, migrants are not only killed during crossing attempts through state actors\u2019 direct interventions. Border security policies affect how journeys are conducted and the level of danger travellers face. In the Channel region, the rising number of deaths from 2023 resulted more from changes in the material circumstances of small boat journeys\u2014increasing numbers of people per boat, the poorer quality of dinghies used, chaos during launches\u2014than the actions of state agents in \u2018spectacular\u201911<\/a><\/sup>Nicholas De Genova, \u2018Spectacles of Migrant \u201cIllegality\u201d: The Scene of Exclusion, the Obscene of Inclusion\u2019, Ethnic and Racial Studies<\/em> 36, no. 7 (2013): 1180\u201398, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/01419870.2013.783710.<\/span> moments of enforcement. This investigation shows how the British and French governments have knowingly manipulated these material circumstances, and therefore hold as much responsibility for the contextual factors contributing to fatalities during crossing attempts as they do the operations of their border police.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Outline and key findings<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    Produced collaboratively by researchers at the Centre for Sociodigital Futures and Border Forensics, this report demonstrates how state policies to \u2018Stop the Boats\u2019 have made crossings more dangerous, and ultimately led to a dramatic rise in deaths in the Channel. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    This report begins with a brief description of the investigation\u2019s \u2018digital counter-forensic\u2019 methodology. Through analysis of data primarily produced by state actors, it demonstrates not only the lethal effects of increased border policing in the Channel, but that authorities have been or ought to have been aware of the lethal consequences of their policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The first substantive section summarises bilateral agreements between the French and British governments to police the UK\u2019s externalised border, focusing specifically on payments intended to prevent small boat departures. Since the 2018 Sandhurst Treaty, the UK has provided over \u00a3625m for more police, equipment, and surveillance technology along the French coast, a huge sum which has been consistently used in negotiations to push the bounds of what the French are willing to do to stop small boat crossings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Section 2 analyses trends in the numbers of people dying during small boat crossings, highlighting a peak in 2023-24 following the signing of the \u00a3476m UK-France Joint Leaders Declaration.12<\/a><\/sup>Prime Minister\u2019s Office, \u2018UK-France Joint Leaders\u2019 Declaration\u2019, GOV.UK, 10 March 2023, https:\/\/www.gov.uk\/government\/publications\/uk-france-joint-leaders-declaration\/uk-france-joint-leaders-declaration.<\/span> On an annual scale, deaths do not clearly correlate with numbers of arrivals, meaning more crossings do not necessarily mean more fatalities. However, there is a positive association between deaths and overcrowding which has increased year on year. The Home Office\u2019s averages for the numbers of people per boat are derived from arrivals data, and therefore may underestimate the actual passenger density of small boats upon departure. Analysing location data from the French coastguard has shown this to be the deadliest moment of the journey, and uncovered a shift in where and how migrants are dying in the Channel: from occasional mass casualty shipwrecks further offshore to frequent crushes and drownings close to French beaches.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Section 3 analyses three state border practices which have contributed to the recent rise in deadly incidents despite improvements in maritime search and rescue (SAR)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    1. \u2018upstream\u2019 anti-smuggling interventions intended to disrupt the supply chains of materials necessary for small boat crossings;<\/li>
    2. increased aerial surveillance along the coast to better coordinate police activity on the ground; and<\/li>
    3. more frequent and violent police interventions to small boats departing the French coast.<\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

      Underlying these practices is the UK government\u2019s strategy to stop and deter illegalised migrants by working with the French government to prevent crossings. They are also rhetorically justified by the claim that \u2018prevent[ing] dangerous small boats crossings\u2019 will \u2018ultimately save lives\u2019.13<\/a><\/sup>Home Office, \u2018Factsheet: Maritime Primacy\u2019, Home Office in the Media, 14 April 2022, https:\/\/homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk\/2022\/04\/14\/factsheet-maritime-primacy\/.<\/span> On its face this argument may appear logical; if no one is able to take to sea, no one would drown. The reality, however, has been that attempts to prevent crossings have endangered more people. As supply chains have been disrupted, facilitators have had to use different suppliers with inferior products. Fewer dinghies reaching the French coast have meant the ones which do get through take on more passengers. More intensive surveillance has made it impossible for under-resourced groups to organise their own journeys, driving overcrowding and the demand for professionalised facilitators. Greater numbers of police patrolling the beaches, and improved capabilities to detect launches, have led to new dangerous tactics such as the \u2018taxi boats\u2019, and police\u2019s aggressive use of riot control weapons has created panic amongst travellers which have caused deadly crushes and dinghies departing underinflated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Despite the increased efforts to prevent small boat crossings and their accompanying dangers, people have always and will continue to cross borders, even as European states introduce ever more restrictive immigration policies and withdraw legal protections for asylum seekers. With political interest in small boat crossings remaining high, the final section looks at the latest policy proposals for \u2018stopping the boats\u2019\u2014interceptions and forced returns at sea\u2014and considers the increased dangers they present for travellers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Considerations for policy-makers<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

      The publication of this report coincides with the anniversary of the UK-France Joint Leaders\u2019 Declaration,14<\/a><\/sup>Prime Minister\u2019s Office, \u2018UK-France Joint Leaders\u2019 Declaration\u2019.<\/span> which precipitated the steepest rise in deaths during Channel crossing attempts in 2023-24. When that agreement was announced in March 2023 there was already sufficient evidence for policy-makers to be aware that their efforts to disrupt supply chains and increase police patrols were leading to more overcrowded dinghies and other risks such as small boats departing from further along the French coast.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Since the Declaration, the harmful effects of intensified border policing efforts have been widely acknowledged in government. In its 2023-24 corporate risk register the Home Office added the new critical risk of \u2018serious harm, injury or death\u2026 as a result of people attempting to arrive in the UK by dangerous methods\u2019 but proposed to mitigate that risk with measures, such as upstream intervention and \u2018engagement with the French\u2019, which this report shows contributed to it.15<\/a><\/sup>Home Office, Annual Report and Accounts 2023 to 2024<\/em>, HC 184 (Home Office, 2024), https:\/\/assets.publishing.service.gov.uk\/media\/66b249b40808eaf43b50de07\/2023-24_Home_Office_Annual_Report_and_Accounts.pdf.<\/span>Ministers have also directly attributed deaths in the Channel to increased border policing, although they still attempt to deflect responsibility onto \u2018appalling people-smuggling gangs who are risking people\u2019s lives\u2019.16<\/a><\/sup>Suella Braverman, \u2018Small Boats Incident in the Channel\u2019, Hansard, 14 December 2022, https:\/\/hansard.parliament.uk\/commons\/2022-12-14\/debates\/D6B7CC8D-19CC-4664-8E71-547E343B5ABC\/SmallBoatsIncidentInTheChannel.<\/span> In November 2024 Angela Eagle, then Minister of State for Border Security and Asylum, conceded that the number of deaths in the Channel \u2018has been the highest on record\u2026 because more pressure is being put on the gangs, the boats are being overloaded and there is more anarchy on the beaches in France\u2019.17<\/a><\/sup>Small Boat Crossings: Hearing on Volume 756<\/em>, House of Commons 6 November 2024 (2024), https:\/\/hansard.parliament.uk\/Commons\/2024-11-06\/debates\/77B1E99D-C873-49E1-9EB9-B6F57C0B939C\/SmallBoatCrossings.<\/span> In a frank exchange during the 2024 G7 Summit between the then French Interior Minister and UK Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper was said to have \u2018praised the heroic efforts of law enforcement to prevent crossings\u2019, but \u2018agreed that this effectiveness had harmful consequences, leading to an increase in deaths<\/em> and violence both amongst migrants and against the police\u2019 [emphasis added].18<\/a><\/sup>Bruno Retailleau, \u2018Bruno Retailleau on X: \u201cJ\u2019ai Rencontr\u00e9 Mon Homologue Britannique, Mme Yvette Cooper, Lors Du G7…\u201d, X (Formerly Twitter), 3 October 2024, https:\/\/x.com\/BrunoRetailleau\/status\/1841891630007124414.<\/span> Despite being fully aware of the harmful consequences, ministers persisted with their policies, and have even pushed for adopting new dangerous tactics to intercept and disable dinghies already at sea.19<\/a><\/sup>Hugh Schofield and Paul Pradier, \u2018France Makes First Interception Targeting Small Boat Crossings to UK\u2019, BBC News, 20 January 2026, https:\/\/www.bbc.co.uk\/news\/articles\/ceqz1lzdxw1o.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \"\"<\/a>
      Social media post from then-French Interior Minister Bruno Retailliaeu on 3 October 2024. Highlighted quotation can be translated into English as: ‘Ms Cooper praised the heroic efforts of law enforcement to prevent crossings to the UK. We also agreed that this effectiveness had harmful consequences, leading to an increase in deaths and violence both amongst migrants and against the police.’<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

      The implications of state actors recognising the harmful effects of border policing in this way are not merely academic. As lawyers acting for the families of those who died in the UK\u2019s largest small boat shipwreck argued during the Cranston Inquiry,20<\/a><\/sup>Cranston, The Cranston Inquiry Report: Report of the Public Inquiry into the Events of 23 to 24 November 2021, When over 30 People Died Attempting to Cross the English Channel in a Small Boat<\/em>.<\/span> Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, given effect in UK legislation by section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, places a positive duty on states to protect individuals whose lives are at risk \u2018which the State knows or ought to know of\u2019.21<\/a><\/sup>Sonali Naik et al., \u2018Closing Statement on Behalf of the Bereaved Families and Survivor\u2019, The Cranston Inquiry, 17 April 2025, 4, https:\/\/cranston.independent-inquiry.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/Cranston-Inquiry-Closing-Statement-Bereaved-Families-and-Survivor-17-04-2025.pdf.<\/span> The data and statements presented in this report show that the governments of the United Kingdom and France knew or ought to have known the risk of death faced by illegalised migrants attempting to cross the Channel, and that those risks were increasing as greater efforts were being made to stop them. For the ministers to then explicitly admit the link between \u2018heroic efforts of law enforcement\u2019 and deaths and violence at the border not only makes further justifications of police deployments on the French coast to \u2018save lives\u2019 untenable. In light of the duty on authorities to take measures to \u2018avoid, minimise, or mitigate\u2019 risk to life,22<\/a><\/sup>Naik et al., \u2018Closing Statement on Behalf of the Bereaved Families and Survivor\u2019, 5.<\/span>  legal arguments regarding possible breaches of the Article 2 right to life of those who have since died at the UK border following state intervention might be considered.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Assessing state actors\u2019 legal liability for border deaths in situations where it has been so carefully outsourced to others\u2014another country\u2019s police force or the natural elements\u2014is difficult, and beyond the scope of this report. Nevertheless, by carefully analysing government data and communications this report raises hard questions for policy makers whose decisions have driven the extreme overcrowding and violent launches of dinghies which have resulted in so much loss of life. <\/strong>As this report is published while the next stage of Franco-British cooperation in policing illegalised migration in the Channel is being finalised for tax years 2026-29,23<\/a><\/sup>Prime Minister\u2019s Office, \u2018UK-France Leaders Declaration\u2019, GOV.UK, 10 July 2025, https:\/\/www.gov.uk\/government\/news\/uk-france-leaders-declaration.<\/span> its findings offer a clear warning of the risks to life in continuing \u2018Stop the Boats\u2019 policies which authorities can no longer overlook nor claim were unforeseeable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Methodology<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

      This report results from a collaborative investigation by researchers at the Centre for Sociodigital Futures (CenSoF) at the University of Bristol and Border Forensics. CenSoF is an interdisciplinary research centre funded by the UK\u2019s Economic and Social Research Council examining how digital technologies increasingly condition social life across various \u2018domains\u2019, including how people move within contemporary societies. Within that broad scope, this project is concerned with understanding how new forms of digital surveillance at the border close down futures for illegalised migrants, sometimes permanently. Border Forensics is an independent research agency based in Geneva, Switzerland which mobilises spatial, visual, and statistical analysis, as well as creative aesthetic practices, to investigate the violence intrinsic to nation-state borders. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The \u2018digital counter-forensics\u2019 approach employed in this investigation reverses the forensic gaze through analysing data gleaned from state actors to show what they reveal, not about those crossing the border, but the authorities policing it.24<\/a><\/sup>Eyal Weizman, Forensic Architecture: Violence at the Threshold of Detectability<\/em> (Zone Books, 2017), 64.<\/span> This methodological choice to work primarily with statistical information brings with it the risk of reproducing the \u2018state gaze\u201925<\/a><\/sup>Martina Tazzioli, \u2018Counter-Mapping the Techno-Hype in Migration Research\u2019, Mobilities<\/em>, 18 January 2023, 1\u201316, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/17450101.2023.2165447.<\/span> on human mobility, and in particular reducing lives which have suffered a premature end at the border to a number in a spreadsheet, evacuated of humanity and loving connection. While names of the dead are provided when known, unfortunately little detail can be offered about their lives here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Substantial activist and journalistic work has already been done to bring the human stories of many of those killed at the UK\u2019s border to public attention.26<\/a><\/sup>Galisson, \u2018Voir Calais et mourir, 367 fois\u2019; Calais Migrant Solidarity, \u2018Deaths at the Calais Border\u2019, Calais Migrant Solidarity<\/em>, n.d., https:\/\/calaismigrantsolidarity.wordpress.com\/deaths-at-the-calais-border\/.<\/span> This investigation complements that work by seeking to understand the wider connections and trends amongst deaths in the Channel and their origins in shifting UK border security policies. By mobilising a range of sources\u2014including state produced datasets and documents\u2014the report demonstrates the extent to which authorities knew, or reasonably ought to have known, the deadly consequences of their practices and contests their \u2018tyranny of the truth\u201927<\/a><\/sup>Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani, \u2018Drifting Images, Liquid Traces: Disrupting the Aesthetic Regime of the EU\u2019s Maritime Frontier\u2019, antiAtlas Journal<\/em>, no. 2 (December 2017), https:\/\/www.antiatlas-journal.net\/anti-atlas\/02-drifting-images-liquid-traces\/.<\/span> with their own figures and statements.<\/p>\n\n\n

      \n
      \n

      \n In this context where states are reluctant to acknowledge the \u2018dark side of their migration politics\u2019, the decision to count the dead becomes a demand for accountability. <\/p>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n\n\n\n\n

      Despite the glut of data gathered by state agencies in surveilling and policing people at the UK\u2019s externalised border there is no official register of those who die or go missing.28<\/a><\/sup>Refugee Council, Deaths in the Channel – What Needs to Change<\/em>, Briefing Paper (2025), https:\/\/www-media.refugeecouncil.org.uk\/media\/documents\/Deaths-in-the-Channel-Refugee-Council-report-January-2025.pdf.<\/span> Against the \u2018agreed metrics to measure progress and success\u201929<\/a><\/sup>Prime Minister\u2019s Office, \u2018UK-France Joint Leaders\u2019 Declaration\u2019.<\/span> through which the British and French governments evaluate their activities\u2014e.g., the number of departures prevented, amount of materials seized, or number of people arriving to the UK\u2014the deaths and harms of border enforcement appear only as externalities, if considered at all. Although France and the UK conduct regular strategic reviews of the effects of UK investment, they refuse to publish their findings.30<\/a><\/sup>Melanie Gower, Unauthorised Migration: UK-France Border Cooperation<\/em>, Commons Library Research Briefing CBP-9681 (House of Commons Library, 2026), 10, https:\/\/researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk\/documents\/CBP-9681\/CBP-9681.pdf.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      In this context where states are reluctant to acknowledge the \u2018dark side of their migration politics\u2019, the decision to count the dead becomes a demand for accountability.31<\/a><\/sup>Charles Heller and Antoine P\u00e9coud, \u2018The Politics of Counting Migrants\u2019 Deaths in the Mediterranean\u2019, Border Criminologies, Faculty of Law Blogs, University of Oxford, 23 October 2020, https:\/\/blogs.law.ox.ac.uk\/research-subject-groups\/centre-criminology\/centreborder-criminologies\/blog\/2020\/10\/politics-counting.<\/span> It is \u2018an expression of a political will to acknowledge and to know\u201932<\/a><\/sup>Katja Franko Aas and Helene O. I. Gundhus, \u2018Policing Humanitarian Borderlands: Frontex, Human Rights and the Precariousness of Life\u2019, British Journal of Criminology<\/em> 55, no. 1 (2015): 12, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1093\/bjc\/azu086.<\/span> not only who those people killed by the border were, but why their lives were cut short. Only with this knowledge can we act to prevent further death in the Channel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \"\"<\/a>
      Officers working in the UK Border Security Command in front of small boats data dashboard, developed by Sorrel AI, shown in Home Office publicity video ‘The Fight to Tackle People-Smugglers: Inside Border Security Command’. Note the prominent green metric and arrow in the top right hand corner comparing number of small boat arrivals to same period last year.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

      Counting the dead<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

      The first stage of the investigation involved cross-referencing records of people who have died or gone missing at the UK\u2019s externalised border collated by activist groups Calais Migrant Solidarity (CMS)33<\/a><\/sup>Calais Migrant Solidarity, \u2018Deaths at the Calais Border\u2019, n.d.<\/span> and the Groupe D\u00e9c\u00e8s,<\/em> and journalist Ma\u00ebl Galisson.34<\/a><\/sup>Galisson, \u2018Voir Calais et mourir, 367 fois\u2019.<\/span> From these lists of all deaths, cases where people were suspected to have died in the course of an illegalised Channel crossing were selected and analysed. Although crossings became regular in November 2018, the first deaths occurred in 2019. Therefore, data analysed for this investigation extends from 2019 to the end of 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The criteria for selecting cases of deaths which occurred during active crossing attempts excluded three which took place after an attempt had finished: Aleksandra Hazhar who died just three days old when her mother gave birth prematurely having been held by police for six hours, freezing cold and soaking wet, after a failed crossing attempt while she pleaded for them to take her to hospital;35<\/a><\/sup>Aleksandra\u2019s mother published a letter explaining why her daughter was born prematurely at Calais Migrant Solidarity, \u2018In the Name of God \/ Au Nom de Dieu\u2019, Calais Migrant Solidarity<\/em>, 29 January 2021, https:\/\/calaismigrantsolidarity.wordpress.com\/2021\/01\/29\/in-the-name-of-god-au-nom-de-dieu\/<\/a>.<\/a> The family also shared their story with the media: May Bulman, \u2018The Tragedy of a Newborn Refugee Who Died as Her Family Tried to Reach Safety\u2019, The Independent<\/em>, 8 March 2021, https:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/uk\/home-news\/refugee-baby-death-france-calais-b1808163.html.<\/span> and Recep Baysal and Mehmet Ali Ge\u00e7s\u00f6yler, two Turkish men killed by a The criteria for selecting cases of deaths which occurred during active crossing attempts excluded three which took place after an attempt had finished: Aleksandra Hazhar who died just three days old when her mother gave birth prematurely having been held by police for six hours, freezing cold and soaking wet, after a failed crossing attempt while she pleaded for them to take her to hospital; and Recep Baysal and Mehmet Ali Ge\u00e7s\u00f6yler, two Turkish men killed by a Polish truck driver who deliberately drove into a group of people walking back to their camp from a failed crossing attempt.36<\/a><\/sup>Matthias Tesson and Marine Langlois, \u2018Calais: une quinzaine de migrants fauch\u00e9s sur l\u2019autoroute, deux personnes tu\u00e9es\u2019, BFM Grand Littoral, 17 November 2023, https:\/\/www.bfmtv.com\/grand-littoral\/calais-une-quinzaine-de-migrants-fauches-sur-l-a16-deux-personnes-tuees_AN-202311170425.html.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      All efforts have been made to attribute bodies found at sea or on beaches to the original incident in which the person entered the water. In cases where there are suspicions from monitoring organisations about the incident someone was involved in but no reasonable certainty\u2014for example, the unidentified person found in a fishing vessel\u2019s nets on 10 December 202137<\/a><\/sup>Olivier Pecqueux, \u2018Un corps remont\u00e9 dans des filets de p\u00eache, au large de Calais\u2019, La Voix du Nord, 10 December 2021, https:\/\/www.lavoixdunord.fr\/1112181\/article\/2021-12-10\/un-corps-remonte-dans-des-filets-de-peche-au-large-de-calais<\/a>.<\/span>\u2014the finding of the body has been logged as a separate incident. There is thus potential for the numbers of deadly incidents in 2019, 2020, 2021, 2024, and 2025 to be slightly inflated by a few incidents, as in those years bodies were found which could not be connected to another known case. Attempts to match bodies found led to discovering that two initially included in the monitoring organisations\u2019 data were not illegalised migrants: a body found on the beach of Les Palominos in Les Hemmes de Marck, France on 18 December 2021,38<\/a><\/sup>Isabelle Hodey, \u2018Marck: un corps d\u00e9couvert samedi sur la plage des Hemmes de Marck\u2019, La Voix du Nord, 19 December 2021, https:\/\/www.lavoixdunord.fr\/1116471\/article\/2021-12-19\/marck-un-corps-decouvert-samedi-sur-la-plage-des-hemmes-de-marck.<\/span> and one on the beach of Knokke-Heist, Belgium found on 24 December 2021.39<\/a><\/sup>Mathias Mari\u00ebn, \u2018Lichaam aangetroffen op strand Knokke-Heist: \u201cIdentificatie volop bezig\u201d\u2019, hln.be, 24 December 2021, https:\/\/www.hln.be\/knokke-heist\/lichaam-aangetroffen-op-strand-knokke-heist-identificatie-volop-bezig~a4bca24f\/.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      There were also discrepancies in the numbers of people missing among the lists cross-referenced during this investigation. On occasions, CMS\u2019 \u2018Deaths at the Calais Border\u2019 blog40<\/a><\/sup>Calais Migrant Solidarity, \u2018Deaths at the Calais Border\u2019, Calais Migrant Solidarity<\/em>, 29 April 2014, https:\/\/calaismigrantsolidarity.wordpress.com\/deaths-at-the-calais-border\/.<\/span> mentions additional missing people not included in official press releases or media reports. CMS\u2019 information is gathered through direct testimony from survivors and witnesses whom authorities do not always believe.41<\/a><\/sup>Ma\u00ebl Galisson et al., \u2018France Failing to Probe Police Role in Syrian Migrant Drowning\u2019, Https:\/\/Www.Newarab.Com\/, The New Arab, 8 July 2025, https:\/\/www.newarab.com\/investigations\/france-no-justice-syrian-migrant-drowned-after-police-chase.<\/span> Missing persons mentioned on the CMS blog not included in other reports have therefore been recorded as \u2018reported\u2019 rather than \u2018confirmed\u2019 missing. The totals for dead and missing people in the Channel are based on this larger figure of \u2018reported missing\u2019 considering the failures of authorities to adequately investigate reports of people missing at sea.42<\/a><\/sup>Tom Levitt et al., \u2018\u201cThey Can\u2019t Grieve\u201d: Families in Limbo as Channel Boat Victims Left Unidentified\u2019, Global Development, The Guardian<\/em>, 1 March 2024, https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/global-development\/2024\/mar\/01\/refugee-migrant-families-france-deaths-unidentified-channel-crossings.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Determining trends<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

      Having conducted a thorough review of the chronology of all fatal incidents involving illegalised migrants attempting to cross the Channel since 2019, attention turned to identifying underlying trends in those incidents. Data on the locations of deaths43<\/a><\/sup>Nicolas Lambert and Ma\u00ebl Galisson, \u2018A Calais La Fronti\u00e8re Tue!\u2019, A Calais La Fronti\u00e8re Tue!<\/em>, n.d., https:\/\/neocarto.github.io\/calais\/.<\/span> and alerts to the French coastguard of small boats in distress44<\/a><\/sup>Minist\u00e8re de la Transition \u00e9cologique, \u2018Op\u00e9rations Coordonn\u00e9es Par Les CROSS\u2019, Datagouv, n.d., https:\/\/www.data.gouv.fr\/datasets\/operations-coordonnees-par-les-cross\/.<\/span> were analysed to understand their shifting geographies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Noting the increased frequency of deadly incidents close to the French coast from Summer 2023, further analysis was conducted on \u2018transparency data\u2019 published by the UK Home Office on the numbers of persons making the journey,45<\/a><\/sup>Home Office, \u2018Small Boat Arrivals: Last 7 Days\u2019, GOV.UK, n.d., https:\/\/www.gov.uk\/government\/publications\/migrants-detected-crossing-the-english-channel-in-small-boats\/migrants-detected-crossing-the-english-channel-in-small-boats-last-7-days.<\/span> as well as French activity to prevent crossings. These data depicted a clear trend towards increasingly overcrowded dinghies, but only captured the numbers of people who successfully crossed, not unsuccessful journeys nor the numbers of people who gave up and elected to be rescued by the French before the dinghy they travelled on arrived to the UK with the remaining passengers.46<\/a><\/sup>See, for example, Ben Quinn and Diane Taylor, \u2018One Dead and Dozens Rescued in Latest Attempt to Cross Channel\u2019, World News, The Guardian<\/em>, 28 July 2024, https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/uk-news\/article\/2024\/jul\/28\/channel-crossing-dead-and-dozens-rescued.<\/a><\/span> Computing the real increase in density of small boats over time required analysing Home Office transparency data alongside operational data from the French coastguard47<\/a><\/sup>Minist\u00e8re de la Transition \u00e9cologique, \u2018Op\u00e9rations Coordonn\u00e9es Par Les CROSS\u2019.<\/span> and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency\u2019s (Frontex) Joint Operations Reporting Application (JORA)48<\/a><\/sup>Frontex, \u2018Joint Operation OPAL COAST\u2019, Public Register of Documents, 26 June 2024, https:\/\/prd.frontex.europa.eu\/document\/joint-operation-opal-coast\/.<\/a><\/span> which also captured the numbers of people who did not reach the UK during their attempts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      To better characterise overcrowding trends, three complementary density measures were derived from these combined datasets to produce figures in Section 2. Final density corresponds to the metric implicitly presented in the Home Office transparency data: it reflects the average number of people per boat based only on those who successfully arrived in the UK. While useful for describing outcomes, this measure underestimates the actual level of overcrowding at departure because it excludes individuals who did not complete the crossing. To demonstrate this inaccuracy, an initialdensity indicator was created using data from the French operational reporting system for coastguard rescue coordination centres (CROSS). These sources capture incidents in which people were rescued by French authorities or where crossings were only partially completed. As some passengers are removed during rescue operations or do not complete the journey, this initial density is systematically higher than the final density derived from the Home Office\u2019s arrival statistics. A third indicator, referred to as potential density, was then estimated to account for the preventive actions of French law enforcement authorities on the beaches, particularly the seizure of boats prior to departure. This measure builds on the final density but also considers the number of boats intercepted or destroyed before they could be launched. The underlying assumption is that, had these boats not been seized, the same pool of people attempting to cross would have been distributed across a larger number of vessels. In other words, the availability of more boats would likely have reduced the number of passengers per boat. The potential density therefore represents the estimated occupancy in the absence of police preventions. Comparing these indicators suggests that the reduction in available boats due to police seizures increases the density of the vessels that do depart, a factor that appears to be associated with heightened risks and, potentially, with the rise in fatal incidents observed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      In addition to analysing the data voluntarily published by these state actors, multiple iterative requests were made under freedom of information laws. Not all were successful \u2013 including a request for information held by the UK on the French police\u2019s activities preventing crossings at a granular level which was refused despite the Home Office having agreed a deal with the French to publish preventions data since 29 April 2024. Information obtained from the French Ministry of Interior by investigative journalist Alexandre L\u00e9chenet49<\/a><\/sup>Alexandre L\u00e9chenet and Esther Webber, \u2018Helicopters, Riding Boots and Vacuum Cleaners: How French Border Force Spends UK Money\u2019, POLITICO, 13 November 2023, https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/helicopters-riding-boots-and-vacuum-cleaners-how-french-border-force-spends-uk-money\/.<\/span> following a court case provided a breakdown of the French police\u2019s activities countering small boats between 2018 and 2023. States exert control over the flows of information regarding their migration policies50<\/a><\/sup>Travis Van Isacker and William Walters, \u2018Rethinking Freedom of Information Research: Selective Flows of Information in Borders and Migration Studies\u2019, Political Anthropological Research on International Social Sciences<\/em> 5, no. 2 (2024): 189\u2013210, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1163\/25903276-bja10060.<\/span> in a way this report challenges but has not been entirely able to subvert.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Fully understanding the trends and mechanisms underlying the rise in numbers of deaths in the Channel required augmenting state data with those collected by migrants\u2019 rights associations, solidarity activists, and journalists documenting violence and death at the UK\u2019s borders. Groups including Alarm Phone, Groupe D\u00e9c\u00e8s, Humans for Rights Network, Human Rights Observers, and Utopia 56 shared data they collect on police activities, distress calls from travellers at sea, and reports of people who have died or gone missing at the border. The additional analysis of their data, combined with what has been obtained from state actors, presented in this report complements these groups\u2019 publications which centre people-on-the-move\u2019s first-hand experiences of the violence and harm of the Franco-British border51<\/a><\/sup>Lily MacTaggart et al., You Can\u2019t Stay but You Can\u2019t Go – State Violence at the UK France Border (Humans for Rigths Network, 2025), https:\/\/static1.squarespace.com\/static\/5a69d94949fc2bad10754433\/t\/692f1b0f7ef338123aa38752\/1764694799800\/HfRN+-+Final+Report.pdf<\/a>; Human Rights Observers, \u2018HRO: Human Rights Observers \u2013 Reports\u2019, HRO: Human Rights Observers, n.d., https:\/\/humanrightsobservers.org\/reports\/<\/a>; Lily MacTaggart et al., We Want to Be Safe: The Impact of Violence against Children on the UK-France Border in 2024 (Project Play, 2025), https:\/\/www.project-play.org\/_files\/ugd\/6fd156_8f08fe713f004cb69238ed232f539137.pdf<\/a>; Katie Hall et al., \u2018Nowhere Safe: The Impact of UK-Funded Border Violence against Children in Northern France\u2019, Project Play, 28 February 2025, https:\/\/www.project-play.org\/_files\/ugd\/6fd156_b06c3cdbce8545c99dd87cf031039e62.pdf.<\/a><\/span> with a more structural account of the consequences of border policies. These organisations have been struggling for years to monitor, hold authorities to account, and ultimately put an end to the violence of the border, and this investigation not only depends upon, but aims to further, their ongoing work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Investigating mechanisms<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

      The three mechanisms of border policing\u2014\u2018upstream\u2019 anti-smuggling interventions, aerial surveillance, and policing the beaches\u2014each required additional efforts to investigate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      To measure anti-smuggling activity by law enforcement, freedom of information requests were submitted to Europol for the number of messages exchanged via its Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA). Although the messages themselves were refused, the message headers provided a way to measure by proxy the amount of Europol activity related to Channel anti-smuggling investigations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The most labour intensive mechanism to investigate was aerial surveillance. First, a list of aircraft involved in surveillance of the Channel was created by observing flight tracks on each of the days for which the UK\u2019s Operation Deveran assessment of risk of small boat crossings52<\/a><\/sup>Met Office, \u2018Op DEVERAN Weather Assessment\u2019, Cranston Inquiry Evidence, 22 November 2021, https:\/\/cranston.independent-inquiry.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/cranston-evidence\/INQ006332_20211122_Channel_Crossing_Assessment_OS.pdf.<\/span> was at least likely.53<\/a><\/sup>A list of assessments for 2023 to 2025 were obtained from the Met Office through freedom of information requests.<\/span> The aircraft were then classified according to the agency operating them. This categorisation made it possible to distinguish the different operational objectives\u2014Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) for law enforcement, or Search and Rescue (SAR) to ensure safety of life at sea\u2014of aerial surveillance at the border. For each category of operator, analysis of Automatic Dependent Surveillance\u2013Broadcast (ADS-B) data signals allowed for establishing where aircraft tended to patrol, the types of flight patterns they followed, and the duration and intensity of their surveillance activity. By separating aircraft by institutional affiliation, the analysis highlights how different actors contribute to the monitoring of the border: some aircraft concentrate on coastal departure areas, others patrol the central Channel or shipping lanes, while others appear to conduct broader reconnaissance flights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      To reconstruct and visualise the aerial surveillance patrols presented in Section 3.2, flight tracks were collected using ADS-B signals. ADS-B is a system with which aircraft periodically broadcast their position, altitude, speed, and identification via radio signals. These signals are received by a distributed network of ground receivers operated by aviation enthusiasts and organisations worldwide, and aggregated on open platforms. By stacking the recorded tracks for the identified aircraft over the periods of time they were active in the Channel, it was possible to reconstruct their movements during surveillance missions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The collected tracks were then processed and analysed using geographic information system (GIS) software. From these data, several indicators were computed, including the total number of flight hours conducted by each aircraft and operator, as well as the spatial distribution of their patrols. Mapping the tracks makes it possible to visualise surveillance corridors, repeated patrol loops, and areas of concentrated monitoring, thereby exposing patterns in how aerial surveillance is deployed along the border.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      It is important to note that ADS-B coverage is not complete. Reception depends on the availability of ground receivers and on whether aircraft are broadcasting ADS-B signals during their missions. Some aircraft may disable or limit their transmissions, and signal reception can be weaker over open sea areas. As a result, the dataset presented in Section 3.2 should be understood as a minimum observable level of aerial surveillance activity: the flights captured represent those that were detectable through the ADS-B network, meaning that the true extent of surveillance activity in the Channel may be higher than what is shown.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Investigating police actions on the beach required researchers to travel to France on multiple occasions over a more than one year period to observe the police first-hand. Additional videos and photographs collected and shared by the migrants\u2019 rights and police monitoring organisations in northern France were also analysed and provided additional insights into police tactics, especially the use of tear gas and other riot control weapons to prevent departures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Qualitative research and implications<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

      To complement the quantitative data analysis and other investigative techniques described previously, significant qualitative and desk research was conducted to substantiate the findings. Interviews and focus group discussions were held with illegalised travellers, activists, search and rescue (SAR) volunteers, and a person facing smuggling charges during field-work in France to gain a first-hand understanding of the effects of intensifying border policing. Researchers also attended border security trade shows and spoke with Home Office civil servants and private sector contractors\u2014including, among many others, representatives from 2Excel Aviation, Anduril, PAL Aerospace, Prevail Partners, and Tekever\u2014working in border security and search and rescue in the Channel. Unfortunately, all formal interview requests were ignored or refused by this cohort, but the frank discussions in the trade show context provided invaluable insights into the otherwise opaque practices of border enforcement. And while they may not commit the same statements to the record, Border Force officers at these events did say they recognised the finding of this report that increased efforts by the French police to prevent crossings have led to more dangerous crossings in recent years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      A review of media reporting and grey literature\u2014including government press releases, migration think tank reports, transcripts of parliamentary debates, and ministerial statements\u2014on UK border security was also conducted. This review informed analysis on the sequence of funding agreements between France and the UK, and especially on the rationale of evolving policies to curb small boat crossings since 2019. Critical academic scholarship and think tank reports demonstrated a consensus view that crossings have become \u2018much more dangerous\u2019 as a result of \u2018measures put in place by the UK and France to stop boats leaving French waters\u2019,54<\/a><\/sup>Mixed Migration Centre, Beyond Restrictions: How Migration and Smuggling Adapt to Changing Policies across the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the English Channel<\/em> (2025), 28, https:\/\/mixedmigration.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/373_Beyond-Restrictions-Med-Atl-and-Eng-Channel-REPORT.pdf.<\/span> and provided a foundation in the literature for the claims made here concerning the foreseeability of the effects of increased border policing. This report makes as much reference as possible to government documents and statements to make it additionally clear that they themselves are aware of the deadly consequences of their policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Section 1.
      Fatal accords: funding an externalised border<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
      \n\n\n\n

      Alongside measures such as creating a domestic \u2018hostile environment\u2019 for illegalised migrants in Britain, ending visa free travel for European nationals following Brexit, and eroding the rights of asylum seekers and refugees, investing in border security in Calais and Dunkirk became seen as a way for ministers to appear \u2018tough\u2019 on migration and placate an increasingly anti-immigrant electorate. Since at least 2009, the British government has routinely paid the French to secure its juxtaposed border controls and police the population of illegalised migrants, the vast majority of whom will claim asylum in the UK,55<\/a><\/sup>Peter William Walsh and Mihnea V. Cuibus, \u2018People Crossing the English Channel in Small Boats\u2019, Migration Observatory, 30 January 2026, https:\/\/migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk\/resources\/briefings\/people-crossing-the-english-channel-in-small-boats\/.<\/span> blocked in northern France. Over the years these sums significantly increased commensurate with the UK government\u2019s increasingly hostile approach to immigration. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The hundreds of millions of pounds invested in fortifying its borders in France did not stop illegalised migration to the UK. Instead, it displaced it from the \u2018canalised routes\u201956<\/a><\/sup>Oral evidence: Border Security and irregular migration: The work of the Border Security Command: Hearing on HC 1321 before the Home Affairs Committee<\/em> (2025), at 33, https:\/\/committees.parliament.uk\/oralevidence\/16519\/pdf\/.<\/span> used in previous decades\u2014trucks, trains, and ferries\u2014to the open sea, where the dangers facing travellers have increased with each deal struck. By precipitating this shift to maritime journeys, increased investment in border security appears to have had the opposite effect to what was intended. According to the Oxford Migration Observatory, with the rise of small boat crossings \u2018the number of people detected arriving in the UK without authorisation has increased sharply\u2019;57<\/a><\/sup>Mihnea Cuibus and Peter William Walters, \u2018Unauthorised Migration in the UK\u2019, Migration Observatory<\/em>, 21 January 2025, https:\/\/migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk\/resources\/briefings\/unauthorised-migration-in-the-uk\/.<\/span> \u2018someone should have thought about displacement\u2019 reflected one Border Force officer in a 2019 internal Home Office review.58<\/a><\/sup>Home Office, \u2018Small Boats Response: Lessons Learned Review June 2019\u2019, Cranston Inquiry Evidence, June 2019, 11, https:\/\/cranston.independent-inquiry.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/cranston-evidence\/INQ006137_Small_Boats_Response__Lessons_Learned_Review_June_2019_Home_Office____06_2019.pdf.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      This section presents a brief history of UK-France bilateral agreements and funding packages in the area of border security and migration control. While many of these agreements covered more general efforts to control illegalised migration towards the UK, particular attention is paid here to their small boat specific items such as providing funding for police patrols and the purchase of surveillance technology. This overview establishes the origins of the dangerous strategy to counter small boat crossings by preventing departures from France as the UK has failed to implement other policies, such as push-backs at sea or deporting arrivals to a third-country like Rwanda. It also highlights that the UK\u2019s border security policies typically have unintended consequences. Just as security infrastructure in and around northern French ports led travellers and facilitators to adapt their methods and discover the UK\u2019s border was more porous than perceived, recent emphasis on \u2018smashing the gangs\u2019 and \u2018breaking their business model\u2019 has fuelled demand for professionalised smugglers.59<\/a><\/sup>Chloe Sydney, How Smuggling Really Works: Drivers, Operations, and Impacts<\/em> (Mixed Migration Centre, 2025), https:\/\/mixedmigration.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/405_How-smuggling-really-works-Drivers-Operations-and-Impacts-Final-For-Web_9Dec2025.pdf.<\/span> And, as will be shown in later sections, increased border surveillance and policing claimed by officials to \u2018save lives\u2019 has led to more deaths.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      History of UK funding for French policing of the Channel border<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

      The modern history of the UK government’s increasing investment in its externalised border in France began in 2009. In Summer of that year an initial \u00a315 million was provided for purchasing scanners and other technology to bolster security screening at juxtaposed controls for vehicle traffic heading to Britain.60<\/a><\/sup>Andrew Woodcock, \u2018Britain Pledges \u00a315m to Tighten Border Controls\u2019, The Independent<\/em>, 6 July 2009, https:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/uk\/home-news\/britain-pledges-pound-15m-to-tighten-border-controls-1734049.html.<\/span> Shortly thereafter, the Pashtun Jungle, which had been home to hundreds of mostly Afghans trying to cross the UK, was evicted by French police.61<\/a><\/sup>Angelique Chrisafis, \u2018\u201cIt Was Filthy, but It Was Our Only Hope\u201d\u2019, UK News, The Guardian<\/em>, 22 September 2009, https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/uk\/2009\/sep\/22\/afghans-camps-calais-police.<\/span> Between 2014-16, as the numbers of people coming to Calais rose during the so-called \u2018long summer of migration\u2019 and established the large Jungle by the port, the UK government provided an additional \u00a3113.66m for \u2018security improvements\u2019 such as fencing, surveillance cameras, and detection technology at the sea ports and Eurotunnel.62<\/a><\/sup>Baroness Williams of Trafford, \u2018Asylum: English Channel – Question for the Home Office\u2019, UK Parliament Written Questions, Answers and Statements, 18 September 2020, https:\/\/questions-statements.parliament.uk\/written-questions\/detail\/2020-09-18\/hl8269.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      In January 2018, the UK and France signed the Sandhurst Treaty to \u2018reduce the numbers of people\u2019 attempting illegalised border crossings \u2018at risk to safety and life\u2019.63<\/a><\/sup>UK\/France: Treaty Concerning the Reinforcement of Cooperation for the Coordinated Management of Their Shared Border, TS No.1\/2018 (2018), https:\/\/assets.publishing.service.gov.uk\/media\/5a74ad7140f0b61df477795e\/Treaty_Concerning_the_Reinforcement_Of_Cooperation_For_The_Coordinated_Management_Of_Their_Shared_Border.pdf.<\/span> Under this agreement the UK gave France an initial \u00a344.5m. One major project financed through the Sandhurst agreement was the establishment of a Joint Centre for Information and Coordination (CCIC) in Coquelles, France where British and French border police are co-located to facilitate real-time exchange of operational intelligence.64<\/a><\/sup>Sajid Javid, \u2018Joint UK-France Centre Opens in Calais to Tackle Criminality at Border\u2019, GOV.UK, 27 November 2018, https:\/\/www.gov.uk\/government\/news\/joint-uk-france-centre-opens-in-calais-to-tackle-criminality-at-border.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \"\"<\/a>
      Funding provided to France by the UK government to police its externalised border. Border Forensics, 2026<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

      When the first groups of predominantly Iranian nationals began making small boat journeys in the final months of 2018,65<\/a><\/sup>Robin Sykes, \u2018English Channel Migrant Boat Crossings\u2019, Library Briefing, House of Lords, 7 March 2019, 4, https:\/\/researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk\/documents\/LLN-2019-0029\/LLN-2019-0029.pdf.<\/span> then-Home Secretary Sajid Javid returned early from his Christmas holiday safari to declare a \u2018Major Incident\u2019. During his speech to the Commons he admitted sea crossings were beginning to emerge in response to heightened security at ports in northern France,66<\/a><\/sup>Sajid Javid, \u2018Oral Statement to Parliament: Migrant Crossings\u2019, GOV.UK, 7 January 2019, https:\/\/www.gov.uk\/government\/speeches\/statement-migrant-crossings.<\/span> a view shared by civil servants at the Home Office who believed the new maritime journeys were \u2018a consequence of extensive investment\u2026 collaboration with the French authorities [and] strengthening security at and around the ports in northern France\u2019.67<\/a><\/sup>David Bolt, An Inspection of the Border Force Operation to Deter and Detect Clandestine Entrants to the UK August 2024 – November 2024<\/em> (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 2025), 36, https:\/\/assets.publishing.service.gov.uk\/media\/67e27002d8e313b503358d26\/An_inspection_of_the_Border_Force_operation_to_deter_and_detect_clandestine_entrants_to_the_UK_August_2024___November_2024.pdf.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      In January 2019, the first bilateral \u2018Joint Action Plan\u2019 specifically to police small boat crossings was announced. The UK pledged \u00a33.25m of new funding on top of what was already agreed with the Sandhurst Treaty for \u2018preventative security measures\u2019 and equipment \u2018such as CCTV, night goggles and number plate recognition\u2019.68<\/a><\/sup>Christophe Castaner and Sajid Javid, \u2018Joint Action Plan by the UK and France on Combatting Illegal Migration Involving Small Boats in the English Channel\u2019, 24 January 2019, https:\/\/data.parliament.uk\/DepositedPapers\/Files\/DEP2019-0107\/Joint_Action_Plan_Small_Boats.pdf.<\/span> Months later, a supplemental \u00a32.25m was given to pay for a contingent of reservists from the French Gendarmerie nationale<\/em> to reinforce police patrols on the beaches of Nord \u2013 Pas-de-Calais.69<\/a><\/sup>Melanie Gower, Unauthorised Migration: Timeline and Overview of UK-French Cooperation<\/em>, Commons Library Research Briefing no. 9681 (House of Commons Library, 2025), https:\/\/researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk\/documents\/CBP-9681\/CBP-9681.pdf.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      This 2019 \u2018Joint Action Plan\u2019 established a key element of the government\u2019s strategy to combat illegalised migration in small boats. As an internal Home Office document outlining \u2018lessons learned\u2019 from its initial response put it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \u2018the most effective way to deal with the small boats modus operandi is to stop migrants launching boats into the channel\u2019.70<\/a><\/sup>Home Office, \u2018Small Boats Response: Lessons Learned Review June 2019\u2019, 15.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

      That Home Office review also made clear that UK money and political pressure could directly influence how far the French would go to try and stop the boats:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \u2018Operational engagement and political intervention brought about significant step changes in the relationship with the French, continuously pushing the boundaries of what was acceptable and what the French would do in support of the effort to stop small boats leaving France.\u201971<\/a><\/sup>Home Office, \u2018Small Boats Response: Lessons Learned Review June 2019\u2019, 5.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

      What was not in place in 2019, but was identified as a \u2018Key Lesson\u2019 to be implemented from the review, was a \u2018sustainable funding stream needed to support work [tackling small boats] going forward\u2019.72<\/a><\/sup>Home Office, \u2018Small Boats Response: Lessons Learned Review June 2019\u2019, 17.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Since 2020, funding packages for the French government to stop small boat crossings have ballooned to over \u00a3620.3m.73<\/a><\/sup>Lord Sharpe of Epsom, \u2018Undocumented Migrants: English Channel – Question for the Home Office\u2019, UK Parliament Written Questions, Answers and Statements, 12 January 2024, https:\/\/questions-statements.parliament.uk\/written-questions\/detail\/2023-12-13\/HL1170.<\/span> In 2020, \u00a328.1m was given to \u2018support France\u2019s efforts against small boats in Boulogne and Dunkerque\u2019, and in July 2021 a further \u00a354m was committed for more technological surveillance and to deploy police patrols as far south as the Baie de Somme. The reason: previous \u2018law enforcement changes\u2019 prompted smugglers to launch boats \u2018further from the ports of northern France\u2019 which had become more heavily policed.74<\/a><\/sup>Home Affairs Committee, Channel Crossings, Migration and Asylum: First Report of Session 2022-23<\/em>, HC 199 (House of Commons, 2022), 13, https:\/\/committees.parliament.uk\/publications\/30524\/documents\/180091\/default\/.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The effects of these interventions on numbers of small boat arrivals to the UK were negligible. Through Fall 2021 the numbers of people arriving continued to rise. In November an unprecedented 209 small boats crossed the Channel, still the record for the most in a single month in 2026.75<\/a><\/sup>The Cranston Inquiry, INQ010749 \u2013 Transcript of Day 16 \u2013 Family Impact Statements and Closing Statements<\/em>, 27 March 2025, https:\/\/cranston.independent-inquiry.uk\/transcript\/transcript-of-day-16-thursday-27th-march-2025\/.<\/span> A report from the Home Affairs Select Committee stated that although there had been an increase in the number of interceptions by the French, assisted by UK intelligence and equipment, in 2021, then-Home Secretary Priti Patel still thought \u2018stronger enforcement on the French side of the Channel was possible\u2019.76<\/a><\/sup>Home Affairs Committee, Channel Crossings, Migration and Asylum: First Report of Session 2022-23<\/em>, 13.<\/span> She was reportedly \u2018seeking a 75 per cent rate [of interception] if UK funding was to continue to be provided\u2019.77<\/a><\/sup>Home Affairs Committee, Channel Crossings, Migration and Asylum: First Report of Session 2022-23<\/em>, 13.<\/span> The French perceived this, along with the Home Secretary\u2019s threats to implement push-back tactics at sea if UK Border Force vessels could not disembark migrants rescued in French ports, as \u2018financial blackmail\u2019.78<\/a><\/sup>Steven Swinford et al., \u2018France Accuses Priti Patel of Financial Blackmail over Migrant Crossings\u2019, The Times<\/em>, 9 September 2021, https:\/\/www.thetimes.com\/uk\/transport\/article\/french-anger-at-priti-patel-plan-to-block-channel-migrants-from-uk-waters-t8wspq9qr; Rajeev Syal et al., \u2018France Accuses Patel of Blackmail in Row over Channel Migrants\u2019, UK News, The Guardian<\/em>, 9 September 2021, https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/uk-news\/2021\/sep\/09\/france-accuses-patel-of-blackmail-in-row-over-channel-migrants.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      On 14 April 2022 the government quietly abandoned its push-back plan, called Operation Sommen,79<\/a><\/sup>Steve Whitton, \u2018Combined SOP for Preventing Small Boats Progressing through UK Territorial Waters\u2019, Border Force Maritime Command, 22 July 2021, https:\/\/cranston.independent-inquiry.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/cranston-evidence\/INQ003287_Border_Force_Maritime_Command__BFMC____Combined_SOP_for_preventing_small_boats_progressing_through_UK_Territorial_Waters_provided_by_MCA_22_07_2021.pdf.<\/span> while announcing that it would seek to remove those arriving on small boats to Rwanda instead. This deportation plan, ruled unlawful by the Supreme Court in November 2023,80<\/a><\/sup>R (on the Application of AAA and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2023] UKSC 42 (The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 15 November 2023), https:\/\/supremecourt.uk\/cases\/uksc-2023-0093.<\/span> was hoped to deter further crossings despite no evidence that it would.81<\/a><\/sup>Matthew Rycroft, \u2018Letter from Matthew Rycroft to Rt Hon Priti Patel: Migration and Economic Development Partnership\u2019, 13 April 2022, https:\/\/www.gov.uk\/government\/publications\/migration-and-economic-development-partnership-ministerial-direction\/letter-from-matthew-rycroft-to-rt-hon-priti-patel-accessible.<\/span> While the Rwanda policy was not formally abandoned until the Labour government took office in July 2024, it was legally blocked following the European Court of Human Rights\u2019 injunction against the first scheduled flight on 14 June 2022.82<\/a><\/sup>Caroline Davies, \u2018The Tortuous Journey of the UK Government\u2019s Rwanda Plan\u2019, World News, The Guardian<\/em>, 22 April 2024, https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2024\/apr\/22\/uk-rwanda-scheme-courts-key-dates.<\/span> The removal of Channel crossers to other European countries, especially France,83<\/a><\/sup>The Home Office\u2019s 2019 Lessons Learned report reveals how \u2018strategic interventions\u2019 such as \u2018face to face meetings between Home Secretary and his French counterpart\u2019 allowed the UK to remove Channel crossers under Article 13.2 of the Dublin Regulation which had never been used and previously would not have been possible. This rule allowed for the removal of someone to another Dublin signatory country if they had been there \u2018for over five months\u2019, but thanks to the negotiations, the French were \u2018interpreting this period of residence generously\u2019.<\/span> which was a key part of the initial government response to try and deter Channel crossers in 2020, was also no longer possible following the end of the Brexit transition period.84<\/a><\/sup>Corporate Watch, \u2018The Home Office Deportation Drive against Channel-Crossing Migrants: A Balance Sheet\u2019, Corporate Watch, 29 April 2021, https:\/\/corporatewatch.org\/the-home-office-deportation-drive-against-channel-crossing-migrants-a-balance-sheet\/.<\/span> Unable to push Channel crossers back into French waters or remove those who arrived to a third country, the British government reinvested in its initial strategy of increased funding for French police to prevent departures. On 14 November 2022 another \u00a362.2m was pledged by the Government to \u2018intensify co-operation with a view to making the small boat route unviable\u2019.85<\/a><\/sup>Bolt, An Inspection of the Border Force Operation to Deter and Detect Clandestine Entrants to the UK August 2024 – November 2024<\/em>, 30.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Much of the money from these initial agreements to prevent small boat departures has gone towards funding larger deployments of police to patrol the French coastline and purchasing equipment to enhance their capabilities. POLITICO Journalist Alexandre L\u00e9chenet obtained official spreadsheets showing purchases made with the Sandhurst funds between 2021 and 2023.86<\/a><\/sup>L\u00e9chenet and Webber, \u2018Helicopters, Riding Boots and Vacuum Cleaners\u2019.<\/span> Those documents showed that British funding went towards:<\/p>\n\n\n\n